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A Civil-military relation is a poorly defined concept in the 
academic literature and in popular usage. This paper begins with a 
conceptualization of civil-military relations as a trinity of 
dimensions including democratic civilian control, effectiveness in 
the achievement of roles and missions, and efficiency in the use of 
resources. Six roles and missions are specified and three different 
entities – the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies – are 
defined as the instruments of security. The paper then highlights 
the ongoing tensions with regard to democratic civilian control: 
that chief executives in Latin America are able to fire ministers of 
defense and senior officers. What is generally lacking, however, in 
all but a few countries, are institutional mechanisms and sufficient 
personnel to manage security and defense issues in a routine 
manner.  Just as important, the vast majority of Latin American 
countries lack the required instruments – strategies, institutions, 
and resource allocations – to achieve effectiveness. A few 
countries, including Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, however, are 
seeking to increase effectiveness through reforms in professional 
military education.   
Virtually all Latin American countries are electoral democracies. 
It would seem to make sense, then, to focus on civilians to 
increase both the institutions of democratic civilian control and 
effectiveness. In East/Central Europe there are several and 
overlapping regional programs – the Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European 
Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – that support 
democratic consolidation and improvements in this paper’s 
conceptualization of civil – military relations. In Latin America, 
there is nothing similar. Even so, due to realities on the ground, 
such as street gangs, humanitarian emergencies, the internal 
conflict in Colombia, and opportunities presented by international 
peacekeeping missions, there are many recent initiatives at the 
regional (Latin American) level and within certain countries along 
the lines of the conceptualization provided here. Unfortunately, 
there is no systematic way in which these important civilian 
initiatives are currently supported by the US Government.  
 USSOUTHCOM could, through a well-defined and sensitive 
strategy, support these initiatives, thereby, supporting democratic 
civilian control, as a key element of democratic consolidation, and 
effectiveness.  By increasing effectiveness, USSOUTHCOM 
would enhance partner capacity that fits within Enhancing 
Partnership of the 2018 Command Strategy.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Specifically USSOUTHCOM efforts could include:  
 Work with the US Department of State and the US 
Congress to have International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) funding increased, especially in the Area 
of Responsibility (AOR). 
 Coordinate with the US Department of State, and the US 
Embassy in-country, to coordinate more actively with the 
US Military Group (USMILGP) in-country to include 
more civilians, especially those likely to become academic 
and political leaders, in all appropriate educational 
programs.  
 Develop a strategy for the Commander, USSOUTHCOM, 
to address meetings and conferences of academics and 
those involved in think tanks and NGOs in the region, and 
in the US, that deal with security and defense issues in the 
AOR. 
 Reach out to credible experts in the US working on issues 
of security and defense in the AOR to establish 
relationships with the leading academic programs, think 




Currently, all Latin American countries but Cuba are functioning 
electoral democracies. There are, however, very great variations 
among the countries regarding political stability and the depth of 
the democratic structures and processes, as well as the legitimacy 
of the regime in the eyes of the population.
1
 A little more than two 
decades ago, all but three Latin American countries (Costa Rica, 
Colombia, and Venezuela) were ruled by authoritarian regimes, 
mainly under military control. The military dimension, therefore, 
what we term “civil-military relations” (defined below) is of 
necessity a relevant factor in the current democratic context, if 
only in terms of historical precedents and political calculations.  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the key elements 
of civil-military relations in the region. In order to do this in a 
manner relevant for both academics and policy makers, the paper 
will provide a general framework for analysis, what I term a trinity 
of dimensions. After outlining this framework, I will illustrate the 
current state of civil-military relations in Latin America by 
highlighting some defining examples. What will become obvious 
in the discussion is the central importance of civilians versus the 
military or other elements of the security sector in civil-military 
relations. The importance of civilians, their expertise and 
incentives, are generally neglected in both the literature and in US 
Government policies as they relate to the armed forces, police, and 
intelligence services in Latin America. Yet as these are electoral 
democracies, and it is the popularly elected civilians who make the 
decisions on policies and the allocation of resources, including in 
national security and defense, we must surely look to civilians.  
Latin America is characterized by new democracies. East/Central 
Europe is also characterized by new democracies, but there are 
fundamental differences. In contrast to Latin America, and other 
world regions for that matter, in East/Central Europe there is a 
long tradition of civilian control; not democratic civilian control, 
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 On structures and processes see www.freedomhouse.org and for 




but at least civilian control. Even more important, there are several 
frameworks and organizations that influence these new 
democracies toward both democratic consolidation and democratic 
civil-military relations. These include the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). If a 
country wants to join any of these institutions, they all impose, to a 
greater or lesser degree, and then continue to enforce, a set of 
expectations and structures that support democratic civil-military 
relations.
2
 There is nothing similar in Latin America. The various 
statements in support of democracy, (probably most notably the 
Declaration in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998 at the Second 
Summit of the Americas), have hortatory value, but little more.  
In this context, in the absence of frameworks and concrete 
incentives, USSOUTHCOM, a key US Government institution 
dealing with Latin American militaries, and to some degree 
civilians, becomes all the more important in promoting the 
consolidation of democratic civil-military relations in the region. 
USSOUTHCOM could develop an explicit strategy to assist those 
predominantly civilian initiatives already percolating in the region. 
This strategy fits logically under Goal 3, “Enable Partnerships”, in 
USSOUTHCOM’s “Command Strategy 2018 Partnership for the 
Americas.”3 
                                                 
2
 For the importance of the system and incentives in Europe see Thomas 
Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global 
Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil – Military Relations,” in 
Democratization Vol 13, #5, December 2006, pp. 776 -90; Thomas 
Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, eds. Global Politics of Defense Reform 
(NY:Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008); and OSCE “Code of Conduct on 
Politico-Military Aspects of Security” 3 December 1994, especially VII, 
#20 - #33, which deal with control  
3
 My experience in the region begins in 1964 in Central America, from 
1967 in Brazil, and since 1996 with programs on civil-military relations 
in virtually all countries in Central and South America. I also attend 
seminars and workshops sponsored by the major research organizations 
at the regional level.   
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APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 
I have found throughout my research and experience that the 
analytical focus exclusively on civilian control and on armed 
forces in national defense is inadequate both empirically and, for 
the purpose of developing comparisons, conceptually.
4
 This 
limited focus is strange, for militaries everywhere have long been 
engaged in humanitarian assistance such as disaster relief, or as 
back- up to the police in domestic upheavals and riots. 
Peacekeeping became increasingly critical in the former 
Yugoslavia, in parts of Africa, East Timor and elsewhere; today up 
to 110 countries have opted to provide peacekeepers. Whereas in 
the recent past there were peacekeepers in Central America, today 
only Haiti requires peacekeepers. Furthermore, several countries 
including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador are involved in 
peacekeeping. Attacks by international terrorists in New York, 
Washington, Madrid, London, and elsewhere, and the launch of 
Washington’s “global war on terrorism,” have compelled 
militaries everywhere to become involved in fighting terrorism to 
a greater or lesser extent.   
Colombia is the main country in the region engaged in counter-
terrorism activities, but others such as Argentina, Brazil, and El 
Salvador are also concerned and, to some degree, prepared. Thus, 
leaders must pay attention to matters both of control and 
outcomes, and with instruments beyond the armed forces. They 
must provide for security that today is both domestic and 
international, with the latter including at least peacekeeping and 
cooperation in intelligence to counter the threat of international 
terrorism. In short, the challenge today is not only to assert and 
maintain control, but also to develop effective militaries and other 
security instruments to implement a broad variety of roles and 
                                                 
4
 See Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, eds. Who Guards the 
Guardians and How: Democratic Civil – Military Relations (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2006); Bruneau and Trinkunas, “Global 
Trends and Their Impact on Civil – Military Relations,” in Bruneau and 
Trinkunas, 2008; and Thomas Bruneau and Cris Matei, “Towards a New 
Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil – Military Relations,” 
Democratization (forthcoming, 2009).  
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missions. In my conceptualization, therefore, while civilian control 
is considered a fundamental aspect of democratic consolidation, 
and is not assumed to exist in any particular case, it is only a part 
of the analysis. An analysis of how effective security forces are, 
and at what cost, is also necessary to understand the contemporary 
importance for democracy of the relationship between elected 
leaders and the security forces. Issues of control remain salient in 
Latin America, but there is increasing awareness in some countries 
and among some groups that effectiveness is also important.  
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
In order to capture the priorities and requirements of both 
democratic consolidation and contemporary security challenges in 
Latin America, I analyze civil-military relations according to the 
two dimensions of control and effectiveness.
5
  
DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL  
At a basic level, what elected leaders are concerned about in most 
of Latin America, and scholars in the established democracies, is 
how to achieve and then maintain the armed forces under 
democratic civilian control. Why are these leaders, and the 
literature on civil-military relations, so heavily focused on control? 
The answer is captured in the classic dilemma, “Who guards the 
guardians?” Any armed force strong enough to defend a country is 
also strong enough to take it over. This is, of course, the 
formulation behind most analyses of civil-military relations, not 
only leading into military governments but also out of them.
6
 The 
issue is all the more important in those states, which includes most 
                                                 
5
 The concept of efficiency is not included here. For our treatment of it, 
and the difficulty of measurement, see Bruneau and Matei, forthcoming 
2009.  
6 
As Samuel E. Finer states, “Instead of asking why the military engage 
in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first 
sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian 
groups are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior 
organization. And, they possess arms.”  Samuel E. Finer, The Man on 
Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002; first published 1962), 5.  
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of Latin America, where the military at one point was the 
government and still enjoys prerogatives it negotiated for itself 
during the transition from authoritarian rule.
7
 While control is 
important for the armed forces, and less so for the police, it is the 
fundamental concern with regard to the intelligence apparatus, 
which works in secrecy, while the very foundation of democracy 
rests on accountability and transparency. This becomes clearer in 
the case of most non-democratic regimes, including military 
governments in Brazil (the National Intelligence Service of Brazil 
or Serviço Nacional de Informações – SNI) and Chile (the 
National Intelligence Directorate or Dirección Nacional de 
Inteligencia – DINA), for example, where intelligence served state 
security, protecting the authoritarian regime against its own 
citizens.   
There are three main instruments that governments use to achieve 
security: the military, police, and intelligence services. Each of 
these in turn can be subdivided. Militaries are divided into 
services, typically army, navy, air force, and possibly marines; 
then further into communities such as infantry, artillery, aviators, 
surface warfare, etc. Police forces can be divided into paramilitary 
units, such as carbineer or gendarmerie as in Argentina and Chile; 
national police forces, as in Colombia and El Salvador; or by state 
or municipality, as in Brazil. Intelligence agencies can be divided 
into military, civilian national, and police intelligence, to name 
just a few.  
How are these three main instruments of state security controlled 
by democratically elected leaders? There is a wide spectrum of 
possible control mechanisms. Most countries, including all of the 
newer democracies in Latin America, however, are characterized 
by the paucity in the number and robustness of these controls. This 
will be dealt with later in this paper. It is not sufficient to focus 
only on the mechanisms for democratic control of the armed 
                                                 
7
 For prerogatives see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil 
and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  It 
should be noted that the Library of Congress conducted a global survey 
of civil – military relations, following Stepan’s prerogatives, in 2003 – 
2004; all of Latin America was included.  
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forces in external defense as this would encompass few of the 
contemporary roles and missions in which the security forces are 
engaged. Rather, we should broaden our approach to encompass 
both the six contemporary roles and missions outlined below, and 
the three instruments of security. Democracies need to consider 
control over all instruments of security in implementing the 
spectrum of roles and missions.  
There has long been an active debate on and about Latin American 
militaries engaging in domestic policing roles. My position is that 
democratic control depends less on the roles and missions that are 
assigned to them than on the mix of security instruments and how 
the control mechanisms are institutionalized. My main argument is 
to conceptualize control in terms of authority over the following: 
institutional control mechanisms, oversight and professional 
norms. The first set of mechanisms – institutional control 
mechanisms – refers to the institutions in place to control the three 
instruments of security. These include a wide spectrum beginning 
with a clear legal basis, ministries of defense, committees in 
parliaments with authority over policy and budgets, national-
security councils and officer-promotion processes. The next 
mechanism – oversight – means whether the civilians actually 
keep track of what the armed forces or other security forces do; are 
they in fact following the direction and guidance they receive? 
This mechanism, and the elements determining whether it works 
or not, includes not only the formal oversight mechanisms, and 
their staffing in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, 
but also the media, NGOs and think tanks. The third mechanism – 
professional norms – refers to whether the security institutions 
have been recruited, educated, trained, promoted, etc. to have 
internalized the previous two control mechanisms, and thus to 
indeed act in accord with the goals of the civilians. These three 
sets of mechanisms are, in the best of circumstances, utilized by 
democratically elected civilians to exercise control over security 
forces. But, there is much more involved in security and 
democracy. Effectiveness must also be considered.   
13 
 
EFFECTIVENESS IN FULFILLING ROLES AND MISSIONS 
What are the current major roles and missions of security forces? 
What should the services be effective and efficient in 
implementing? I have determined from a review of the literature 
and conducting our Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) 
programs in Latin America, that they fall into six major categories: 
1) fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars; 2) fight, and be 
prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies; 3) fight global 
terrorism; 4) fight crime; 5) provide support for humanitarian 
assistance; and, 6) prepare for and execute peace support 
operations. Security sectors, including the armed forces in Latin 
America, are to some extent currently engaged in all six of these 
roles or missions.   
While there are some cases in which effectiveness in 
implementing roles and missions can be demonstrated, 
effectiveness in general is best determined by whether or not a 
state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the six roles. Success is 
very difficult to measure in many, or even most, instances. When 
countries prepare to fight wars against external enemies, the 
greatest indicator of success in most cases is avoidance of armed 
combat, whether it is due to the perception of overwhelming force 
on one side, success in the use of diplomatic tools, integration into 
alliances, etc.   
In the case of internal wars, with recent cases including Guatemala 
and currently Colombia, there are economic, political and social 
causes behind the conflicts and the security forces alone cannot 
resolve them. Fighting tends to drag on, and it is all but impossible 
to ever declare “victory.” The fight against global terrorism can be 
considered successful when no attack occurs. It is impossible to 
know, however, if there was no attack due to effective security 
measures, or because the terrorists simply chose not to attack. 
Fighting crime is ongoing, as is the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Neither criminals nor natural disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes and hurricanes are ever going to disappear. These are 
a matter of preparation and mitigation, keeping the level of crime 
or loss of life and property within acceptable limits (leaving aside 
the question, acceptable to whom?).  
14 
 
With regard to peacekeeping, the issue is similar. If conflicts 
between parties arise due to religious, ethnic, or political 
differences and require intervention by foreign security forces, in 
some cases without the agreement of the government, the troops’ 
presence in itself will not resolve the fundamental causes behind 
the fighting. Rather, they may provide some stability, separate the 
antagonists, and allow space for negotiations. While we may have 
much to say about what is required for security measures to be 
effective, we must nevertheless be realistic about our ability to 
measure effectiveness.  
Based upon my comparative studies of what is necessary to be 
effective in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions, I can 
suggest three basic requirements. First, there must be a plan in 
place, which may take the form of a strategy. Examples include 
national security strategies, national military strategies, strategies 
for disaster relief, doctrine on intelligence, counterterrorism 
doctrine, etc. Second, there must be structures and processes both 
to formulate the plans and to implement them. These include 
ministries of defense, national security councils or other means of 
inter-agency coordination. Third, a country must commit 
resources, in the form of political capital, money and personnel, to 
ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces and other assets 
needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any 
one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how any 
state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions. 
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
CONTROL 
The overwhelming issue in civil-military relations in Latin 
America remains civilians asserting control over the armed forces. 
There are many recent dramatic examples of this assertion and 
include the following: President Lula da Silva relieving the 
leadership of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência 
Brasileira de Inteligência - ABIN) in September 2008 over an 
alleged wiretap plot; President Daniel Ortega’s unwillingness to 
appoint a Minister of Defense in Nicaragua, and appointing 
instead for the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense, a 
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person with no background in national security and defense, as the 
highest level official; and President Rafael Correa firing Minister 
of Defense Wellington Sandoval and the heads of the Ecuadorian 
Army and Air Force in April 2008. The examples of civilians 
asserting their control are numerous and extend to most countries 
in the region. In short, democratically elected civilians in the 
region do indeed have the power to control the armed forces; and 
they do not hesitate to use it.  
However, in interviews with civilians in the ministries of defense 
in several countries in the region, it is clear that these civilians do 
not think they have control over the armed forces. This is the case 
at a minimum in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. (Of 
course in Mexico there is not even a ministry of defense but rather 
separate ministries for the army and the navy.) In the last three it is 
no surprise as the ministries, as bureaucracies, are weak in contrast 
to the armed forces.  But even in Argentina, where the ministry is 
fairly robust, civilians do not think they have control. Based on my 
discussions with civilians who are currently or were until fairly 
recently in positions in the ministries, there are two main 
problems. First, everywhere, including in Argentina, there are very 
few civilians who have regular or continuing positions in the 
ministries; most are consultants or advisors with short-term 
contracts, so even where there is a group of experts, which is rare 
in most of the region, they lack stability. Second, there are no 
agreed-upon measures of merit or effectiveness to prove or 
disprove civilian control. The contacts between civilians and the 
military are fairly formal or distant, except in the case of Chile. 
There are currently some positive signs, however. A group of 
academics/practitioners, centered around the Latin American 
Network for Security and Defense (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de 
América Latina - RESDAL), which is physically based in Buenos 
Aires and includes researchers from Argentina, Brazil, and 
Guatemala, are studying the structures and processes of ministries 
of defense in order to determine how to strengthen them. From 
these studies one can only hope that they begin to understand the 
bureaucratic, including personnel, requirements to strengthen 




If the discussion above regarding the three main requirements to 
achieve effectiveness in roles and missions is accurate, few 
countries in the region can be expected to be effective in 
implementing roles and missions. There are, however, some 
indications of awareness and efforts to increase effectiveness in 
both governments, and in NGOs and think tanks. In this discussion 
I will follow the same sequence as in the section above and touch, 
if only briefly, on the issues of plan, or policy; structures and 
processes; and resources.  
While there are several experiences in the writing of the so-called 
white books, only Colombia has developed, and published, what 
we could term a national security strategy.
8
 Most Colombian and 
outside observers are impressed with President Alvaro Uribe’s 
“Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 2003,” not only as a 
document but also for the specification of the tasks to be 
accomplished and the measures of effectiveness. Other countries, 
such as Brazil and Peru, have published nothing or, as in the case 
of Ecuador and Guatemala, the white books are best seen as coffee 
table picture books on the defense sector. The example of 
Honduras is instructive as the 200+ page national security strategy, 
written two years ago, has yet to be signed and issued by the 
president. There are very good reasons why democratically elected 
presidents do not want to publish national security strategies. If 
they do, and set out fairly specific goals, they can be attacked by 
their opponents for failure to achieve goals. It is, then, all the more 
laudable that President Alvaro Uribe included specific measures in 
his national security strategy, and the Colombian government 
issues reports indicating how well the government, and especially 
the security forces, are doing in achieving them.   
                                                 
8
 Writing white books was all the rage for a while. See for example the 
following.  Juan Ramón Quintana, ed., Libros Blancos de Defensa: 
Concertación Política y Diseño Estratégico Comparado (La Paz: MOD, 
2001) and Guillermo Pacheco Gaitán, Ed., Políticas de Defensa y 
Elaboración de Libros Blancos: Experiencia Latinoamericanas (Santiago, 
Chile: CHDS, 2003).  
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Concerning structures and processes, I don’t think it inappropriate 
to engage in a bit of stereotyping in stating that for developing 
institutions in Latin America it is a hard and uphill struggle. 
Except for the Catholic Church, armed forces, and some sectors of 
the economy, institutional development, including the 
government, as well as political parties and interest groups, is slow 
and haphazard in the region. This is clearly the case in the areas of 
national security and defense. Ministries of defense are weak 
pretty much everywhere; national security councils, or their 
equivalents, but for Brazil and El Salvador, barely exist; and 
defense committees in the congresses, but for Argentina and Chile, 
are weak or nonexistent. There is minimal attention to, and 
commitment of resources to, the creation of institutions in the 
areas of defense. Interestingly enough, this also applies to 
Colombia, which does face ongoing internal challenges and the 
threat of terrorism, and where President Uribe was elected in 2002 
and then reelected in 2006 to combat them. Essentially, President 
Uribe acts as his own minister of defense, although Minister 
Santos is in fact quite accomplished and credible, and there is no 
national security council.   
There are, however, currently indications in several countries, 
including Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, that their governments 
recognize the need for more qualified military personnel to 
increase effectiveness. They are thus investing time and other 
resources in upgrading and adapting professional military 
education. In addition, several countries that are actively engaged 
in peacekeeping, including Argentina and Chile, have established 
training centers specifically for education and training in this area. 
Further, with support from the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI), most of the Central American countries are participating 
in the training in Cobán, Guatemala. 
If one considers that Latin America is generally a “zone of peace,” 
it is not surprising that the level of military expenditure is low. 
However, if we think more broadly about the six roles and 
missions, and the increased importance of peacekeeping and the 
ongoing need to support civilian governments in dealing with 
organized crime and natural disasters, then surely the armed 
forces, and other security sectors, need increased resources. 
18 
 
According to Marcela Donadio of The Security and Defense 
Network of Latin America (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de 
América Latina – RESDAL) in a recent article, due to high prices 
for commodities funding for the armed forces in the region have 
increased, but these funds “… hardly provide the predictable 
source of funds that are required for long-term modernization.”9 
In short, in line with my approach to analyzing civil-military 
relations, Latin America is lacking not only in the institutions with 
which to exercise civilian control but also those which seek to 
enhance the effectiveness in implementing roles and missions. In 
contrast, in East/Central Europe, as stated at the beginning of this 
paper, there are many and overlapping frameworks and incentives 
to achieve these two dimensions of the trinity (as well as the third, 
efficiency, which is not included here). In Latin America, in this 
current era of democracy, not only are domestic incentives lacking 
for developing the institutions for more robust civil-military 
relations, but external incentives are also negligible.    
CIVILIAN RESPONSIBILITIES 
The overwhelming majority of Latin American countries are 
electoral democracies. Thus, by definition, the responsibility for 
policies and decisions in budgets lies with civilians. For easily 
understandable historical and bureaucratic reasons there are few 
civilians in positions of authority who care about, let alone, know 
about national security and defense. The vast majority of chief 
executives in the region, with the exception of Presidents Bachelet 
and Uribe quite literally “don’t know what they don’t know.” The 
results are easy to see in such dramatic situations as President 
Berger of Guatemala arbitrarily cutting the army size and budget 
by 50% in 2005, leading to even more serious gang problems, or 
President Lula da Silva firing the Minister of Defense, who then 
fired the Chief of Staff of the Air Force after the air disaster in Sao 
Paulo in July 2007. These, and other, chief executives do not know 
                                                 
9
 See Marcela Donadio, “Seguridad Nacional, Inc.” Americas Quarterly 
Vol 1 #2, Fall 2007, p. 88 
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much about national security and defense, nor do they have any 
incentive to invest time and energy to learn.
10
 
SIGNS OF PROGRESS 
Despite, or maybe because, of the bleak situation in civil-military 
relations described above, there are currently many important 
signs in the region of dramatically increased awareness by some 
civilians in NGOs and think tanks of the importance of national 
security and defense, and of the need to deal with these issues. It is 
no surprise that in Central America, at least in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras, where the threat of violence from 
organized crime and the gangs or “pandillas” is so dramatic, that 
NGOs and think tanks are involved in studies and promoting 
policies (often contradictory) for governments to respond. For 
example, the region-wide Jesuit university system, the Central 
American University (Universidad Centroamericana - UCA) is 
involved in studies of the “maras” (Central American term for 
gangs). In Colombia, after more than 40 years of internal conflict, 
there are two major think tanks – the Fundación Seguridad y 
Democracia (Security and Democracy Foundation) and Fundación 
Ideas para la Paz (Ideas for Peace Foundation), that are 
conducting studies, organizing conferences, supporting websites 
and publishing documents on all aspects of security. At the region-
wide level there are four major initiatives. The first is RESDAL, 
which, while virtual, is based in the important NGO in Buenos 
Aires, Regional Strategic Security in 2000 (Seguridad Estratégica 
Regional en el 2000 – SER 2000). It has a comprehensive website 
and has now published the second edition of the Atlas 
Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina (Comparative Atlas 
of Defense in Latin America), published in both English and 
French in time for the recent defense ministerial in Banff, Alberta, 
Canada in September 2008. RESDAL is actively promoting 
research, publications and a wide variety of activities to call 
attention to issues not only of control but also effectiveness.   
                                                 
10
 This general argument is made very forcefully by David Pion – Berlin 
and Harold Trinkunas in “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore 
Defense Policy in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review Vol 
42, #3 October 2007, pp. 76 – 100.  
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The second is FLACSO-Chile (Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales or College of Latin American Social Sciences), 
which published in late 2007 their study on security and defense in 
the region with attention to the armed forces, police and 
intelligence agencies. This study has now been published in 
English as a “Report on the Security Sector in Latin America and 
the Caribbean” for much wider dissemination. Thirdly, the Latin 
American Studies Association (LASA), which brings together 
academics and activists from the region, North America, and 
beyond, has a section on Defense and Democracy. For the past 
few years, the section has been growing in numbers and activities. 
What was once a heavily anti-US Government organization, and 
definitely anti-military, is now a very active forum for academics 
and activists from the region, and beyond, to discuss all aspects of 
security and defense. And fourth, the Instituto Universitario 
General Gutiérrez Mellado (General Gutiérrez Mellado University 
Institute) in Madrid is involved in these same issues with a recent 
publication on “La Administración de la Defensa en América 
Latina” (The Administration of the Armed Forces in Latin 
America). It must be stressed that these four initiatives, all based 
on very credible institutions, bring together an ever-expanding 
network of researchers and practitioners. There are other scattered 
initiatives such as with FLACSO, Quito, the Catholic University 
also in Quito, and even the University of Sao Paulo and the 
University of Sao Paulo in Campinas, which also deal with 
different aspects of domestic or international security. And, the 
initiatives are expanding.   
All of the above-noted initiatives have gained momentum within 
the last four years. They are a recognition that there are some 
serious challenges, issues or (in the case of peacekeeping) 
opportunities in the general area of national security and defense. 
These initiatives are important in their own right, and academics 
and activists are aware that these are important issues. What is 
probably even more important is the fact that in Latin America 
many of these academics and activists sooner or later assume 
important positions in government. In the region, unlike the 
United States with an already well-established civil service, there 
are always governmental positions available for civilians and 
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retired military who know, or profess to know, about issues of 
national security and defense. Frequently in the RESDAL 
network, somebody who is involved in an NGO or think tank 
assumes an important position in a ministry of defense, domestic 
security organization, or international organization. With the 
increasing level of activity of the NGOs and think tanks, with 
increased networking, these individuals can and do play 
increasingly important roles. Whether these roles are positive, or 
not, and favorable to US interests, depends to some degree on how 
well these individuals are engaged with academics and 
practitioners from the US. Unfortunately, for every Marcos 
Robledo, advisor to President Bachelet for international and 
defense affairs, there is at least one Juan Ramon Quintana, 
Minister of the Presidency in Bolivia.  
OPPORTUNITY FOR SOUTHCOM 
The overwhelming emphasis on US-sponsored programs in the 
region for training and education in national security and defense 
is in support of the armed forces and the police. The main funding 
lines of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
Program, the Counterterrorism Defense Program (CTFP), the 
Traditional Commander Activities (TCA) Program, etc. are 
designed for the military and police, and administered by the 
USMILGPs, or equivalent, in-country. Even where there are large 
USAID programs, supposedly for institutional building, they 
rarely, if ever, support civilians in the area of national security and 
defense, and civil-military relations. The Department of State has 
minimal resources, and normally minimal interest in these same 
areas. The CCMR, at least in Latin America, does engage with 
these NGOs and think tanks, but is not specifically funded for 
engagement with civilians. Further, with the very meager funds 
currently available in IMET in the region, and the lack of stability 
in programs, which are largely determined by the USMILGPs, it is 
difficult to maintain any kind of ongoing programs in support of 
civilians.  
USSOUTHCOM could develop a strategy of engagement and 
support of NGOs and think tanks in order to enhance interest and 
expertise of civilians in these areas. Institutions such as RESDAL 
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and FLACSO are already up and running. It would only require a 
well-designed and sensitive plan to engage with them. This might 
prove challenging, but is feasible. If poorly formulated and 
implemented the strategy would likely be counterproductive.  
CONCLUSION 
The countries in Latin America are virtually all democratic. Civil-
military relations, even in terms of only democratic civilian 
control, not to mention effectiveness, are rudimentary and fraught 
with tensions. There are a few initiatives in a few countries, 
mainly Argentina, Chile, Colombia and El Salvador, toward 
improving and institutionalizing both control and effectiveness. 
There is much more in the civilian area – NGOs and think tanks – 
but that is fairly ad hoc. USSOUTHCOM could develop a strategy 
to support these initiatives with an idea of encouraging them as a 
way to improve all of civil-military relations. Civil-military 
relations, in terms of control, would encourage democratic 
consolidation. In terms of effectiveness, it would increase partner 
capacity.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Work with the US Department of State and the Congress 
to have IMET increased, especially for the AOR. The 
Center for Civil-Military Relations recently completed an 
empirical study of the impact of IMET on graduate 
education. In the process of conducting that research the 
CCMR team found not only universal support for IMET 
among US military and civilians, but also data to support 
its positive impact. Most of those interviewed also agreed 
that the level of IMET, currently less than $90 
million/year, should be increased. In the AOR, particularly 
after the very negative impact of the American Service-
Members’ Protection Act (ASPA sanctions), where most 
of the countries sanctions are located, there are minimal 
IMET funds to maintain current programs, let alone regain 
the lost momentum. USSOUTHCOM should work with 
the Department of State and key congressional members 
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and staffers to have the overall level of IMET increased, 
particularly in the AOR. 
 Coordinate with the US Department of State and the US 
Embassy in-country, particularly the Deputy Chief of 
Mission (DCM), Political, and Public Diplomacy, to 
identify and include more civilians, especially those likely 
to become academic and political leaders, in the 
educational programs sponsored by the USMILGPs. 
Currently, there is no strategy to include civilians, and in 
some countries (Nicaragua for example, until the current 
MILGP Commander) they are intentionally excluded. The 
most successful programs CCMR has been involved in 
throughout the AOR have been joint projects of the 
USMILGP, with IMET funds, with the Political Section of 
the US Embassy. This should be the model to identify, 
incorporate, and hopefully maintain contact with those 
civilians who are likely to assume leadership positions in 
the countries’ executive and legislative branches that deal 
with security and defense.  
 Develop a strategy for the Commander, USSOUTHCOM, 
to address meetings and conferences of academics and 
those involved in think tanks and NGOs in the region, and 
in the US, that deal with security and defense issues in the 
AOR. There are frequent international conferences in the 
region, such as those sponsored by FLACSO and the 
International Studies Association (ISA), and in North 
America sponsored by LASA, where the Commander 
could have a speaking role to convey his interest and 
knowledge about the AOR. I have been to many 
conferences where I was the only US Government (USG) 
employee participating. I have invited USG 
representatives from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense office and the US Department of State Bureau of 
Western Hemisphere Affairs to participate in a LASA 




 Reach out to credible experts in the US working on issues 
of security and defense in the AOR to establish 
relationships with the leading academic programs, think 
tanks, and NGOs. Currently, a few USG employees teach 
and publish on Latin American security and defense 
issues, and have excellent contacts with academics and 
participants in think tanks and NGOs in the region. The 
key word is “credible” in that these experts must have 
degrees from leading programs, teach, publish, and be 
engaged in networks with their contemporaries in the 
AOR. Anything less is likely to backfire, as has happened 
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 WHEMSAC PROGRAM SPONSORS 
Yuma Proving Ground, established in 1943, is one of the 
largest military installations in the world. Its role is to maintain 
the quality of America’s combat forces. Yuma Proving Ground 
conducts a wide range of military tests consisting of nearly 
every commodity in the ground combat arsenal. The Proving 
Ground objective is to ensure the excellence of equipment and 
munitions issued to America’s fighting forces.  
The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is 
one of ten unified Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in the 
Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing 
contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for 
Central and South America, the Caribbean, Cuba, and their 
territorial waters; as well as for the force protection of U.S. 
military resources at these locations. USSOUTHCOM Policy 
& Strategy Directorate is responsible for the technical 
oversight of the WHEMSAC Program. 
Florida International University (FIU) based in Miami, 
Florida, is Miami-Dade County’s first public, four-year 
university, and has developed a powerful record of innovation 
and research. With 38,000 students, 1,000+ full-time faculty 
and more than 134,000 alumni, FIU is one of the 25 largest 
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than 200 bachelors, masters and doctoral programs. FIU 
emphasizes research as a major component of its mission, and 
is one of the nation’s top public research universities.  
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and technology development center at Florida International 
University. Our multidisciplinary, industry-experienced team 
of scientists and engineers develops next-generation, 
integrated solutions to    environmental, energy, and 
information challenges delivering the quality and value of a 
top-ranked research university to clients in government. The 
Center’s focus is to address real world problems through 
multidisciplinary research collaborations within the 
University’s applied and basic research units. The center’s 
mission is to solve issues in energy security, environmental 
stewardship and security technology. The ARC is the entity 











   
 
